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There has been con5id~rable interest of late in computer viruses. One aspect
of this interest has been to ask if computer viruses are a form of artificial
life, and what that might imply.
This paper is a condensed, high-Ievell' description of computer viruses-
their history, structure, and how they relate to some properties that might
derme artificial life. It provides a general introduction to the topic without
requiring an extensive background in computer science.
The interested reader might pursue [9, I, 2] and [5] for more detail about
computer viruses and their properties. The description in this paper of the
origins of computer viruses and their structure is taken from [9].
·Expected to appear in Artificial Life II, SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity,
vol. XII, Eds. D. Farmer, C. Langlan, S. Rasmussen and C. Taylor, Addison-Wesley,
1991.
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2 What is a Computer Virus?
The term computer virus is derived from and analogous to a biological virus.
The word virus itself is Latin for poison. Viral infections are spread by the
virus (a small shell containing genetic material) injecting its contents into a
far larger body cell. The cell then is infected and converted into a biological
factory producing replicants of the virus.
Similarly, a computer virus is a segment of machine code (typically 200-
4000 bytes) that will copy its code into one or more larger "host" programs
when it is activated. When these infected programs are run, the viral code is
executed and the virus spreads further. Viruses cannot spread by infecting
pure data; pure data is not executed. However, some data, such as fIles with
spreadsheet input or text files for editing, may be interpreted by application
programs. For instance, text files may contain special sequences of charac-
ters that are executed as editor commands when the file is first read into the
editor. Under these circumstances, the data is "executed" and may spread a
virus. Data files may also contain "'hidden" code that is executed when the
data is used by an application, and this too may be infected. Technically
speaking, however, pure data itself cannot be infected.
2.1 Worms
Worms are another form of software that is often referred to by the unin-
formed as a computer virus. The Internet Worm of November 1988 is an
example of one of these programs.
Unlike viruses, worms are programs that can run independently and
travel from machine to machine across network connections; worms may
have portions of themselves running on many different machines. Worms do
not change other programs, although they may carry other code that does,
such as a true virus.
In 1982, John Shoch and Jon Hupp of Xerox PARC (Palo Alto Research
Center) described the first computer worms. {7] They were working with an
experimental, networked environment using one of the first local area net-
works. While searclUng for something that would use their networked en-
vironment, one of them remembered reading The Shockwave Rider by John
Brunner, written in 1975. This science fiction novel described programs that
traversed networks, carrying information with them. Those programs were
called tapeworms in the novel. Shoch and Hupp named their own programs
worms, because in a similar fashion they would travel from workstation to
" .
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workstation, reclaiming file space, shutting off idle workstations, delivering
mail, and doing other useful tasks.
Few computer worms have been written in the time since then, espe-
cially worms that have caru;ed damage, because they are not easy to write.
Worms require a network environment and an author who is familiar not
only with the network services and facilities, but also with the operating
facilities required to support them once they have reached the machine. The
Internet worm incident of November, 1988 clogged machines and networks
as it spread, and is an example of a worm. [8]
Worms have also appeared in other science fiction literature. Recent
"cyberpunk" novels such as Neuromancer by William Gibson [4] refer to
worms by the term "virus." The media has also often referred incorrectly
to worms as viruses. This paper focuses only on viruses as defined here.
Many of the comments about viruses and artificial life may also be applied
to worm programs.
2.2 Other Threats
There are many other kinds of vandalware that are often referred to as
viruses, including bacteria, trojan horses, logic bombs, and trapdoors. These
will not he described here. The interested reader can find explanations in
[91 and [21.
2.3 Names
As the authors of viruses generally do not name their work formally and
do not come forward to claim credit for their efforts, it is usually up to the
community that discovers a virus to name it. A virru; name may be based
on where it is first discovered or where a major infection occurred, e.g., the
Lehigh and Alameda viruses. Other times, the virus is named after some
definitive string or value used by the program, e.g., the Brain and Den Zuk
viruses. Sometimes, viruses are named after the number of bytes by which
they extend infected programs, such as the 1704 and 1280 viruses. Still
others may be named after software for which the virus shows an affinity,
e.g., the dBase virus. In the remainder oftrus paper, viruses are referred to
by commonly-accepted names. Refer to [9] or [IOJ for detailed lists of virus
names and characteristics.
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2.4 A history lesson
The first use of the term virus to refer to unwanted computer code occurred
in 1972 in a science fiction novel, When Harley Was One, by David Gerrold.
(The recent reissue of Gerrold's book has this subplot omitted.) The de-
scription of virus in that book does not fit the currently-accepted definition
of computer virus-a program that alters other programs to include a copy
of itself. Fred Cohen formally defined the term computer virus in 1983. (1]
At that time, Cohen was a graduate student at the University of Southern
California attending a security seminar. The idea of writing a computer
virus occurred to him, and in a week's time he put together a simple virus
that he demonstrated to the class. His advisor, Professor Len Adelman,
suggested that he call his creation a computer virus. Dr. Cohen's thesis and
later research were devoted to computer viruses.
It appears, however, that computer viruses were being written by other
individuals, although not named such, as early as 1981 on Apple II computers.1
Some early Apple II viruses included the notorious "Festering Hate," "Cy-
beralds," and "Elk Cloner" strains. Sometimes virus infections were mis-
taken as trojan horses, as in the "Zlink virus," [sic) which was a case of
the Zlink communication program infected by "Festering Hate." The "Elk
Cloner" virus was first reported in mid-198!.
It is only within the last three years that the problem of viruses has
grown to significant proportions. Since the first infection by the Bmin virus
in January 1986, up to April 1, 1990, the number of known viruses has
grown to nearly 60 distinctly different IBM PC viruses. The problem is not
restricted to the IBM PC, and now affects all popular personal computers.
Mainframe viruses do exist for a variety of operating systems and machines,
but all reported to date have been experimental in nature, written by serious
academic researchers in controlled environments.
Where viruses have flourished is in the weak security environment of the
personal computer. Personal computers were originally designed for a single
dedicated user-little, if any, thought was given to the difficulties that might
arise should others have even indirect access to the machine. The systems
contained no security facilities beyond an optional key switch, and there was
a minimal amount of security-related software available to safeguard data.
Today, however, personal computers are being used for tasks far different
from those originally envisioned, including managing company databases
and participating in networks of computer systems. Unfortunately, their
IPrivaLe communication from Joe Dellinger.
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hardware and operating systems are still based on the assumption of single
trusted mer access, and thls allows computer viruses to flourish on those
machines.
2.5 Formal structure
True viruses have two major components: one that handles the spread of
the virus, and a manipulation task. The manipulation task may not be
present (has null effect), or it may act like a logic bomb, awaiting a set of
predetermined circumstances before triggering. These two virus components
wHl be described in general terms, and then more specific examples will be
presented as they relate to the most common personal computer: the mM
PC. Viruses on other machines behave in a similar fashion.
2.5.1 A Note About Mainframe Viruses
AB already noted, viruses can infect minicomputers and mainframes as well
as personal computers. Laboratory experiments conducted by various re-
searchers have shown that any machine with almost any operating system
can support computer viruses. However, there have been no documented
cases of true viruses on large multi-user computers other than as experi-
ments. This is due, in part, both to the greater restrictions built into the
software and hardware of those machines, and to the way they are usually
used. Our further comments will therefore be directed towards PC viruses,
with the understanding that analogous statements could be made about
mainframe viruses.
2.5.2 Structure
For a computer virus to work, it somehow must add itself to other executable
code. The viral code must be executed before the code of its infected host (if
the host code is ever executed again). One form of classification of computer
viruses is based on the three ways a virus may add itself to host code: as a
shell, as an add-on, and as intrusive code.
Shell viruses A shell virus is one that forms a "shell" (as in "eggshell"
rather than "Unix shell") around the original code. In effect, the virus
becomes the program, and the original host program becomes an internal
subroutine of the viral code. An extreme example of this would be a case
where the virus moves the original code to a new location and takes on its
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identity. When the virus is finished executing, it retrieves the host program
code and begins its execution.
Unfnfected Program
Infected Program
Figure 1: Shell Virus Infection
Add-on viruses Most viruses are add-on viruses. They function by ap·
pending their code to the end of the host code, or by relocating the host
code and adding their own code to the beginning. The add-on virus then
alters the startup information of the program, executing the viral code be-
fore the code for the main program. The host code is left almost completely
untouchedj the only visible indication that a virus is present is that the file
grows larger.
Intrusive viruses Intrusive viruses operate by replacing some or all of
the original host code with viral code. The replacement might be selective,
as in replacing a subroutine with the virus, or inserting a new jnterrupt
vector and routine. The replacement may also be extensive, as when large
portions of the host program are completely replaced by the viral code. In
the latter case, the original program can no longer function.
2.5.3 Triggers
Once a virus has infected a program, it seeks to spread itself to other pro-
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Figure 2: Add-on Virus Infection
this, but most viruses are not simple viruses. Common viruses wait for a
specific triggering condition, and then perform some activity. The activity
can be as simple as printing a message to the user, or as complex as seeking
particular data items in a specific file and changing their values. Often,
viruses are destructive, removing files or reformatting entire disks.
The conditions that trigger viruses can be arbitrarily complex. If it is
possible to write a program to determine a set of conditions, then those
same conditions can be used to trigger a virus. This includes waiting for a
specific date or time, determining the presence or absence of a specific set of
files (or their contents), examining user keystrokes for a sequence of input,
examining display memory for a specific pattern, or checking me attributes
for modification and permission information. Viruses also may be triggered
based on some random event. One common trigger component is a counter
used to determine how many additional programs the virus has succeeded in
infecting-the virus does not trigger until it has propagated itself a certain
minimum number of times. Of course, the trigger can be any combination
of these conditions, too.
2.6 How do viruses spread?
Computer viruses can infect any form of writable storage, including hard





Figure 3: Intrusive Virus Infection
when a computer is booted from an infected disk, or when an infected pro-
gram is run. It is important to realize that often the chain of infection can be
complex and convoluted. A possible infection might spread in the following
way:
• A client brings in a diskette with a program that is malfunctioning
(because of a viral infection).
• The consultant runs the program to discover the cause of the bug-the
virus spreads into the memory of the consultant's computer.
• The consultant copies the program to another disk for later investiga-
tion-the virus infects the copy utility on the hard disk.
• The consultant moves on to other work preparing a letter-the virus
infects the screen editor on the hard disk.
• The system is switched off and rebooted the next day-the virus is
cleared from memory, only to be reinstalled when either the screen
editor or copy utility is used next.
• Someone invokes the infected screen editor across a network link, thus
infecting their own system.
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2.7 The three stages of a virus's life
For a virus to spread, its code must be executed. This can occur either
as the direct result of a user invoking an infected program, or indirectly
through the system executing the code as part of the system boot sequence
or a background administration task.
The virus then replicates, infecting other programs. It may replicate
into only one program at a time, it may infect some randomly-chosen set
of programs, or it may infect every program on the system. Sometimes a
virus will replicate based on some random event or on the current value of
the clock. The different methods will not be presented in detail because the
result is the same: there are additional copies of the virus on your system.
Finally, most viruses incorporate a manipulation task that can consist
of a variety of effects (some odd, some malevolent) indicating the presence
of the virus. Typical manipulations might include amusing screen displays,
unusual sound effects, system reboots, or the reformatting of the user's hard
disk.
2.7.1 Activating a virus
The IBM PC can be used as an example to illustrate how a virus is activated.
Viruses in other types of computer systems behave in similar manners.
The IBM PC boot sequence This section gives a detailed description
of the various points in the IBM PC boot sequence that can be infected by
a virus. We will not go into extensive detail about the operations at each
of these stages; the interested reader may consult the operations manuals of
these systems, or any of the many "how-to" books available.
The ruM PC boot sequence has six components:
• ROM BIOS routines
• Partition record code execution
• Boot sector code execution
• IO.SYS and MSDOS.SYS code execution
• COMMAND.COM command shell execution
• AUTOEXEC.BAT batch file execution
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ROM BIOS When an IBM PC, or compatible PC, is booted, the
machine executes a set of routines in ROM (read-only memory). These
routines initialize the hardware and provide a basic set of input/output
routines that can be used to access the disks, screen, and keyboard of the
system. These routines constitute the basic input/output system (BIOS).
ROM routines cannot be infected by viral code (except at the manu-
facturing stage), as they are present in read-only memory that cannot be
modified by software. Some manufacturers now provide extended ROMs
containing further components of the boot sequence (e.g., partition record
and boot sector code). This trend reduces the opportunities for viral in-
fection, but also may reduce the flexibility and configurability of the final
system.
Partition Record The ROM code executes a block of code stored at
a well-known location on the hard disk (head 0, track 0, sector 1). The IBM
PC disk operating system (DOS) allows a hard disk unit to be divided in,to
up to four logical partitions. Thus, a 100Mb hard disk could be divided into
one 60Mb and two 20Mb partitions. Tbese partitions are seen by DOS as
separate drives: "e," "D," and so OD. The size of each partition is stored
in the partition record, as is a block of corle responsible for locating a boot
block on one of the logical parti tions.
The partition record code can be infected by a virus, but the code block
is only 446 bytes in length. Thus, a common approach is to hide the original
partition record at a known location on the disk, and then to chain to this
sector from the viral code in the partition record. This is the technique used
by the New Zealand virus, discovered in 1988. (See figures 4 and 5.)
ROM ~ Partition BootRecord Sector
I f
Figure 4: Hard disk before infection
Boot sectors The partition record corle locates the first sector on the
logical partition, known as the boot sector. (IT a floppy disk is inserted, the
ROM will execute the code in its boot sector, head 0, track 0, sector 1.) The




~ Viral Original BootCorle Part. Ree Sector
I ~
Figure 5: Hard disk after infection by New Zealand Virus
detailed information on the layout of the filing system on disk, as well as
corle to locate the file IO.SYS. That file contains the next stage in the boot
sequence. (See Figure 6.)
ROM ~ Boot IO.SYSSector File
I f
Figure 6: Floppy disk before infection
A cornIDon use of the boot sector is to execute an application program,
such as a game, automatically; unfortunately, thls can include automatic
initiation of a virus. Thus, the boot sector is a COIDIDon target for infection.
Available space in the boot sector is limited, too (a little over 460 bytes
is available). Hence, the technique of relocating the original boot sector
while filling the first sector with viral code is also used here.
A typical example of such a "boot sector" virus is the Alameda virus.
This virus relocates the original boot sector to track 39, sector 8, and replaces
it with its own viral code. (See Figure 7.)
ROM
L I
~ Viral IO.SYS BootCode File Sector
I ~
Figure 7: After Alameda Virus Infection
Other well-known boot sector viruses include the New Zealand (on floppy
only), Brain, Search, and Italian viruses. Boot sector viruses are particu-
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lady dangerous because they capture control of the computer system early
in the boot sequence, before any anti-viral utility becomes active.
MSDOS.SYS, IO.SYS The boot sector next loads the IO.SYS file,
which carries out further system initialization, then loads the DOS system
contained in the MSDOS.SYS file. Both these files could be subject to
viral infection, although no known viruses target them.
Command shell The MSDOS.SYS code next executes the command
shell program (COMMAND. COM). Thls program provides the interface
with the user, allowing execution of commands from the keyboard. The
COMMAND.COM program can be infected, as can any other .COM or
.EXE executable binary file.
The COMMAND.COM file is the specific target of the Lehigh virus that
struck Lehigh University in November 1987. This virus caused corruption of
hard disks after it had spread to four additional COMMAND. COM files.
AUTOEXEC batch files The COMMAND. COM program is next
in the boot sequence. It executes a list of commands stored in the AUTOEXEC.BAT
me. This is simply a text file full of commands to be executed by the com-
mand interpreter. A virus could modify this file to include execution of
itself. RaJf Burger has described how to do exactly that in his hook Com-
puter Viruses-A High Tech Disease. His virus uses line editor commands
to edit its code into batch files. Although a curiosity, such a virus would be
slow to replicate and easy to spot. This technique is not used by any known
viruses "in the wild."
Infection of a user program A second major group of viruses spreads
by infecting program code files. To infect a code file, the virus must insert
its code in such a way that it is executed before its infected host program.
These viruses come in two forms:
Overwriting The virus writes its code directly over the host program, de-
stroying part or all of its code. The host program will no longer execute
correctly after infection.
Non-overwriting The virus relocates the host code, so that the code is
intact and the host program can execute normally.
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A common approach used for .COM files is to exploit the fact that
many of them contain a jump to the start of the executable code. The virus
may infect the programs by storing this jump, and then replacing it with a
jump to its own code. When the infected program is run, the virus code is
executed. When the virus finishes, it jumps to the start of the program's
original code using the stored jump address. (See Figure 8.)
~,-----__H_o_st C_O_d_e _~ t
• I










Host Code Simplest overwritinginfection strategy
Figure 8: Infection of user applications
Notice that in the case of the overwriting virus, the more complex infec-
tion strategy often means that all but a small block of the original program
is intact. This means that the original program can be started, although
often it will exhibit sporadic errors or abnormal behavior.
Memory-resident viruses The most "successful" viruses to date exploit
a variety of techniques to remain resident in memory once their code has
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been executed and their host program has terminated. This implies that,
once a single infected program has been run, the virus potentially can spread
to any or all programs in the system. This spreading occurs during the entire
work session (until the system is rebooted to clear the virus from memory),
rather than during a small period of time when the infected program is
executing viral code.
Thus, the two categories of memory-resident virus are:
Transient The viral code is active only when the infected portion of the
host program is being executed.
Resident The virus copies itself into a block of memory and arranges to
remain active after the host program has terminated. The viruses are
also known as TSR (Terminate and Stay Resident) viruses.
Examples of memory-resident viruses are all known boot sector viruses, the
Israeli, Cascade, and Traceback viruses.
If a virus is present in memory after an application exits, how does it re-
main active? That is, how does the virus continue to infect other programs?
The answer is that it also infects the standard interrupts used by DOS and
the BIOS so that it is invoked by other applications when they make service
requests.
The IBM PC uses many interrupts (both hardware and software) to
deal with asynchronous events and to invoke system functions. All services
provided by the BIOS and DOS are invoked by the user storing parameters
in machine registers, then causing a software interrupt.
When an interrupt is raised, the operating system calls the routine whose
address it finds in a special table known as the vector or interrupt table.
Normally, this table contains pointers to handler routines in the ROM or
in memory-resident portions of the DOS (see figure 9). A virus can modify
this table so that the interrupt causes viral code (resident in memory) to be
executed.
By trapping the keyboard interrupt, a virus can arrange to intercept
the CTRL-ALT-DEL soft reboot command, modify user keystrokes, or be
invoked on each keystroke. By trapping the BIOS disk interrupt, a virus can
intercept all BIOS disk activity, including reads of boot sectors, or disguise
disk accesses to infect as part of a user's disk request. By trapping the DOS
service interrupt, a virus can intercept all DOS service requests including









Figure 9: Normal interrupt usage
A typical virus might trap the DOS service interrupt, causing its code












Figure 10: Interrupt vectors with TSR virus
2.7.2 Replication strategies
Types Viruses can be grouped into four categories, based on the type of
files they infect:
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• Boot sector viruses that only infect boot sectors (or rarely, partition
records)
• System viruses that are targeted against particular system files, such
as the DOS command shell
• Direct viruses that scan through the DOS directory structure on disk
looking for suitable files to infect
• Indirect viruses that wait until the user carries out an activity on a
file (e.g., -execution of a program) before infecting it
Transient viruses are always direct in that they attempt to infect one or
more files (usually in the same directory or home directory) before termi-
nating. Resident viruses can be either direct or indirect (or worse, both).
The recently reported Traceback virus infects any file executed (indirect),
while also incrementally scanning the directory structure (direct).
In general, indirect viruses are slower to spread, but often pass unnoticed
as their infection activities are disguised among other disk access requests.
Signatures to prevent reinfection One problem encountered by viruses
is that of repeated infection of the host, leading to depleted memory and
early detection. In the case of boot sector viruses, this could (depending
on strategy) cause a long chain of linked sectors. In the case of a program-
infecting virus (or link virus), repeated infection may result in continual
extension of the host program each time it is reinfected. There are indeed
some viruses that exhibit this behavior (e.g., the Israeli virus extends .EXE
files 1808 bytes each time they are infected).
To prevent this unnecessary growth of infected files, many viruses im-
plant a unique signature that signals that the file or sector is infected. The
virus will check for this signature before attempting infection, and will place
it when infection has taken placej if the signature is present, the virus will
not reinfect the host.
A virus sjgnature can be a characteristic sequence of bytes at a known
offset on disk or in memory, a specific feature of the directory entry (e.g.,
alteration time or file length), or a special system call available only when
the virus is active in memory.
The signature is a mlxed blessing. The virus would be easier to spot if
reinfections caused disk space to be exhausted or showed obvious disk ac-
tivity, but the signature does provide a method of detection and protection.
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Virus sweep programs are available that scan files on disk for the signatures
of known viruses, as are "inoculation" routines that fake the viral signature
in clean systems to prevent the virus from attempting infection.
3 Viruses as Artificial Life
Now that we know what computer viruses are, and how they spread, we can
ask if they represent a form of artificial life. The first, and obvious, question
is "What is life'!" Without an answer to this question, we wlll be unable to
say if a computer virus is "alive."
One list of properties associated with life was presented in [3]. That list
included:
• Life is a pattern in space-time rather than a specific material object.
• Self-reproduction, in itself or in a related organism.
• Infonnation storage oj a self-representation.
• A metabolism that converts matter/energy.
• Functional interactions with the environment.
• Interdependence of parts.
• Stability under perlurbations of the environment.
• The ability to evolve.
• Growth or expansion
Let us examine each of these characteristics in relation to computer
viruses.
3.1 Viruses as patterns in space-time
There is an obvious match to this characteristic. Viruses are represented by
patterns of computer instructions that exist over time on many computer
systems. Viruses are not associated with the physical hard ware, but with
the instructions executed (sometimes) by that hardware.
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3.2 Self-reproduction of viruses
One of the primary characteristics of computer viruses is their ability to
reproduce themselves (or an altered version of themselves). Thus, this char-
acteristic is met.
3.3 Information storage of a self-representation
This, too, is an obvious match for computer viruses. The code that defines
the virus is a template that is used by the virus to replicate itself. This is
similar to the DNA molecules of what we recognize as organic life.
3.4 Virus metabolism
This property involves the organism taking in energy or matter from the
environment and using it for its own activity. Computer viruses use the
energy of computation expended by the system to execute. They do not
convert matter, but make use of the electrical energy present in the computer
to traverse their patterns of instructions and infect other programs. In this
sense, they have a metabolism.
3.5 Functional interactions with the virus's environment
Viruses perform examinations of their host environments as part of their
activities. They alter interrupts, examine memory and disk architectures,
and alter addresses to hide thi;!ffiselves and spread to other hosts. They
very obviously alter their environment to support their existence. Many
viruses accidentally alter their environment because of bugs or unforeseen
interactions. The major portion of damage from all computer viruses is a
result of these interactions.
3.6 Interdependence of virus parts
Living organisms canJ;lot be arbitrarHy divided without destroyjng them.
The same is true of computer viruses. Should a computer virus have a
portion of its "anatomy" excised, the virus would probably cease to function
normally, if at all. Few viruses are written with superfluous code, and even
so, the working code cannot be divided without destroying the virus.
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3.7 Virus stability under perturbations
Computer viruses run on a variety of machines under different operating
systems. Many of them are able to compensate (and defeat) anti-virus and
copy protection mechanisms. They may adjust on-the-fly to insufficient
storage, disk errors, and other exceptional events. Some are capable of
running on most variants of popular personal computers under almost any
software configuration-a stability and robustness seen in few commercial
applications.
3.8 Virus evolution
It is here that viruses display a difference from systems we traditionally
view as "alive." No computer viruses evolve as we commonly use the term,
although it is conceivable that a very complex virus could be programmed
to evolve and change. However, such a virus would be so large and complex
as to be many orders of magnitude larger than most host programs, and
probably bigger than the host operating systems. Thus, there is some doubt
that such a virus could run on enough hosts to allow it to evolve.
Mutations of viruses do exist, however. There are variants of many
known viruses, with as many as 15 known for some mM PC viruses. The
variations involved can be very small, on the order of two or three instruc-
tions difference, to major changes involving differences in messages, activa-
tion, and replication. The source of these variations appears to be program-
mers (the original virus authors or otherwise) who alter the viruses to avoid
anti-viral mechanisms, or to cause different kinds of damage.
There is also one case where two different strains of a Macintosh virus
are known to interact to form infections unlike the "parents," although these
interactions produce "sterile" offspring that are unable to reproduce further.
[61
3.9 Growth
Viruses certainly do exhibit growth. Some transient viruses will infect every
file on a system after only a few activations. The spread of viruses through
commercial software and public bulletin boards is another indication of their
wide-spread replication. One reasonable set of estimates had the number of
computer virus infections in 1989 at a level 50% above the 1988 rate.2 The
2Personal communication, Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Cook, quoting Bell Labs'
estimates.
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number of new virus "species" reported in the first four months of 1990
has undergone a 15-fold increase over the same period in 1989. Clearly,
computer viruses are exhibiting major growth.
3.10 Other behavior
As already noted, computers viruses exhibit "species" with well-defined
ecological niches based on host machine type, and variations within these
species. These species are adapted to specific environments and will not
survive if moved to a different environment.
Some viruses also exhibit predatory behavior. For instance, the DenZuk
virus w1ll seek out and overwrite instances of the Brain virus if both are
present on the same system. Other viruses exhibit territorial behavior-
marking their infected domain 50 that others of the same type will not enter
and compete with the original infection.
4 Summary and Comments
Our examination of computer viruses leads us to the conclusion that they
are very close to what we might define as "artificial life." Rather than rep-
resenting a scientific achievement, this probably represents a flaw in our
definition. To suggest that computer viruses are alive also implies to me
that some part of their environment-the computers, programs, or operat-
ing systems-also represents artificial1ife. Can life exist in an otherwise
barren and empty ecosystem? A definition of "life" should probably include
something about the environment in which that life exists.
I would also be disappointed if computer viruses were considered as the
first form of artificial life, because their origin is one of unethical practice.
Viruses created for malicious purposes are obviously bad; viruses constructed
as experiments and released into the public domain are likewise unethical,
and poor science besides: experiments without controls, strong hypotheses,
and the consent of the snbjects. Facetiously, I suggest that if computer vi-
ruses evolve into something with artificial consciousness, this might provide
a doctrine of "original sin" for their theology.
More seriously, I would suggest that there is something to be learned from
the study of computer viruses, that is, the importance of the realization that
experimentation with systems in some way (almost) alive can be dangerous.
Computer viruses have caused millions of dollars of damage and untold
aggravation. Some of have been written as harmless experiments, and others
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as malicious mischief. All have firmly rooted themselves in the pool of
available computers and storage media, and they are likely to be frustrating
users and harming systems for years to come. Similar but considerably more
tragic results could occur from careless experimentation with organic forms
of artificial life. 'We must never lose sight of the fact that "real life" is of
much more importance than aartificiallife," and we should not allow our
'experiments to threaten our experimenters.
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